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Guided by the immigrant revitalization theory, this paper will argue that improvements in 
family structure plays a role in the immigration-crime relationship. The data used in this 
study were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System, American Community 
Survey, and decennial census. This paper uses cross-sectional and longitudinal models to 
investigate whether family structure plays a role in the immigration-crime relationship. 
The longitudinal models will look at changes in homicide data from 2007 and 2017. 
Findings from the longitudinal models show no support to indicate that family structure 
plays a role in the immigration-crime relationship. However, findings from Black and 
White non-Hispanic cross-sectional models do show some support for the argument that 
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Despite the public perception that immigration is associated with an increase in 
crime, empirical evidence shows that a large concentration of immigrants in a 
geographical area is linked to a reduction in crime (Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey and 
Kubrin, 2018; Ousey and Kurbin, 2009; Reid et al., 2005; Stowell and Martinez, 2009; 
Velez, 2009; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Also, empirical evidence from individual-level 
studies demonstrate that immigrants are less likely to engage in crime and have lower 
incarceration rates than U.S. born individuals (Hagan and Palloni, 1999; Rumbaut et al., 
2006; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush, 2005). Given the strong evidence suggesting 
a negative relationship between immigration and crime, scholars have shifted their 
attention to explaining the observed phenomenon.  
The immigrant revitalization perspective posits that a large concentration of 
immigrants in a community will lead to a decrease in crime as a result of increased social 
control and economic growth (Lee and Martinez, 2002; Velez, 2009). Social control is 
defined as the ability of a community or society to realize common goals and values, or 
the ability of a community to regulate itself based on certain values (Janowitz, 1975; 
Sampson, 1986). Scholars have tested it using many different units of analysis, analytical 
methods, and data sets. With continued effort to research the link between immigration 
and crime scholars have made significant progress. However, scholars have concentrated 
their attention towards economic organization without paying sufficient attention to 
investigating family structure as an influential factor.  
In earlier criminological literature, family instability has been linked to crime at 
macro-level units. Sampson (1987) argued that there were three explanations for the 
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family disruption and crime link: first, broken homes cause juvenile delinquency at the 
individual level; second, marital and family disruption may decrease formal social 
control, which consists of actions carried out by government and/or community 
organizations, in a community; and finally, family disruption in communities may also 
decrease informal social control, which is usually carried out by community residents. 
Additionally, if there is only one parent in the household then parental supervision will be 
weakened (Ousey, 2000). Family structure is connected to community organization, 
parental supervision, and social attachment, making family structure a highly complex 
factor for structural theories of crime. Sampson (1986) emphasized the importance of 
family and marital disruption, which represented informal social control in his article, as 
predictors of crime. Sampson and Groves (1989) further established the importance of 
family disruption in criminology by highlighting that family disruption plays a significant 
role in social disorganization. Family structure also plays an important role in 
criminology at the individual level. Laub and Sampson (2001) accentuate the importance 
of family structure in reducing crime via their empirical work on life-course criminology. 
Lastly, Ousey (2000) argued that the removal of a parent could weaken the attachment 
between the parent and their child, which could threaten social control.  Given the 
connection between family structure and crime and its link to social control, it must be 
examined in detail with respect to immigration and crime literature.  
 Ousey and Kubrin (2009) analyzed the immigration and crime relationship using 
longitudinal data and found evidence suggesting family instability explains the 
relationship. However, Ousey and Kubrin (2009) used the total population in their 
analyses and did not disaggregate by race or ethnicity. This is problematic because there 
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is evidence implying the effect of immigration is assumed to be different for Whites, 
Blacks, and Hispanics (Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner, 2016; Harris and Feldmeyer, 
2013; Xie and Baumer, 2018). In particular, Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than 
Whites to experience reductions in crime because they reside in communities with a large 
immigrant concentration. Residential segregation, demographic changes, and individual 
preferences may play a role in the differential effects of immigration on family structure 
and crime.  
Expanding the immigration and crime research to include family structure as a 
main independent variable may provide support for the immigrant revitalization 
perspective, and insight into racial and ethnic differences in the immigration and crime 
relationship. This paper aims to understand if changes in family structure can explain the 
immigration and crime relationship. This study will use county-level data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) and National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) to 
assess the effects of immigrant concentration and family structure on homicide 
victimizations for Latinos, non-Latino Whites, and non-Latino Blacks. Investigating how 
family structure and immigration are related to crime can offer theoretical knowledge and 









2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will begin with an overview of the immigrant revitalization 
perspective. Next, family structure will be discussed with regards to crime and 
immigration. Then, a review of theoretical arguments regarding racial and ethnic 
differences will be provided. An overview of the racial invariance hypothesis and 
immigrant destination types will also be presented. Lastly, studies that analyze racial and 
ethnic differences in the immigration and crime relationship are presented, followed by 
studies analyzing the racial invariance hypothesis and immigrant destination types.  
 
IMMIGRANT REVITALIZATION 
Traditional criminological theory has posited that immigration is linked to crime. 
Social disorganization theory, as developed by Shaw and McKay (1942), argues that 
neighborhoods with increased residential instability, low socioeconomic status, and a 
significant level of ethnic heterogeneity will experience more crime. With the presence of 
these structural variables, communities will be unable to create formal and informal 
social controls which may, in turn, lead to the inability to solve problems (Sampson and 
Groves, 1989). An increase in immigration is argued to increase ethnic heterogeneity and 
residential instability within a community, and lead to social disorganization. Social 
disorganization theory suggests that racial and ethnic heterogeneity, as a result of 
immigration, weakens informal social controls because community members will interact 
with each other less due to cultural and language differences, therefore, impeding the 
development of social ties within the community. With weak social ties, a community 
will experience an attenuation in informal social control, which may lead to crime 
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(Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012). However, arguments positing a positive relationship 
between crime and immigration have received skepticism. 
Recently, scholars have considered the hypothesis that immigration reduces 
crime. In 2002, Lee and Martinez theorized that areas with large concentrations of 
immigrants might experience a decrease in crime as a result of new forms of social 
organization. In particular, Lee et al. (2001) hypothesized that communities with a large 
proportion of immigrants will experience a lower level of crime as a result of ties to 
family members and the labor market. This theoretical framework is referred to as the 
immigrant revitalization thesis (Lee et al., 2001; Lee and Martinez, 2002). Large 
concentrations of immigrants have been linked to an increase in job availability, increases 
in product demand, and consumption of services, all of which improve economic 
conditions (Peri, 2012; Waldinger, 1989). As the share of immigrants within an area 
increases, economic growth will ensue and will likely encourage attachment to the labor 
market, which will then strengthen social control (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Ramey, 
2013; Velez, 2009).  
In addition to developing economic growth, a large proportion of immigrants in 
an area will also strengthen formal and informal social institutions. Immigrants 
strengthen informal institutions by developing strong ties with family and community 
members. Social ties may then be utilized for providing social support and increasing 
social control (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Velez, 2009). Immigrants also strengthen formal 
social institutions, such as churches, community centers, and schools.  
Immigrant revitalization theory argues that communities with large concentrations 
of immigrants will experience a reduction in crime. Therefore, residents within these 
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communities are theorized to benefit from the large immigrant concentration (Lee et al., 
2001; Sampson, 2008; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Lee et al. (2001) suggest that immigrants 
reduce crime within the geographic area for the immigrant population and indirectly 
reduce crime for other groups of individuals by altering the community structure. In 
short, an increasing presence of immigrants in communities is theorized to improve 
economic factors and family structure, leading to an increase in informal social control 
and a decrease in crime for residents within the geographic area.  
 
RACIAL INVARIANCE THESIS 
 
Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that crime in neighborhoods was the result of 
community conditions, such as poverty and residential mobility. They also noted that 
more crime occurs in neighborhoods experiencing poverty and residential mobility 
regardless of the ethnic/racial groups residing in the neighborhood. In other words, the 
consequences of social disorganization are racially invariant. The racial invariance thesis 
states that individuals residing in disadvantaged neighborhoods should experience high 
levels of crime regardless of ethnicity/race and that crime is a matter of types of places 
instead of the types of individuals (Hernandez et al., 2018; Peterson and Krivo, 2005; 
Steffensmeier et al., 2010). Sampson and Wilson (1995) have also posited that factors 
leading to violent crime should be invariant across different race groups and stem from 
structural differences between communities. Despite the description of the racial 
invariance thesis developed by scholars over the years, there is disagreement in how to 
operationalize racial invariance.  
There are two methods for measuring racial invariance: qualitative and 
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quantitative. Sampson et al. (2018) argue for a qualitative conceptualization instead of a 
quantitative conceptualization of the racial invariance thesis. A qualitative 
conceptualization is when the “predictors of crime need only operate in similar directions 
across different racial and ethnic groups or neighborhoods, that is, have a similar quality” 
(Velez, 2018: 40). For example, if one were to evaluate the effects of unemployment on 
crime with the qualitative conceptualization and found that unemployment has a 
significant positive effect on crime in Black and White neighborhoods, that would be 
considered as support for the racial invariance hypothesis. They argued that the “ultimate 
sources of crime are the same across racial groups” (Sampson et al., 2018: 17). Velez 
(2018) agreed with Sampson et al. (2018) that the source of crime that affected racial 
groups similarly in quality is evidence supporting the racial invariance thesis. However, 
Velez (2018) stated that using a quantitative conceptualization would enable scholars to 
make a precise claim regarding racial invariance and can be used to detect differences. A 
quantitative conceptualization is when scholars look for “statistically identical 
coefficients in race-specific models…” (Sampson et al., 2018: 17). In the end, Velez 
(2018) argues that using a quantitative conceptualization can provide important 
information regarding race and crime, despite potential issues regarding measurement 
error and random fluctuations as mentioned by Sampson et al. (2018).  
Given that the main objective of this study is to analyze how structural factors 
influence crime across racial and ethnic groups, the racial invariance thesis has a very 
relevant and important role. Based on the racial invariance thesis, family disruption and 
immigration should affect crime for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics similarly with regards 
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to the directionality of the effect because the sources of crime are the same for all racial 
and ethnic groups (Sampson, 2018).  
  
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN THE IMMIGRATION AND CRIME 
RELATIONSHIP 
Scholars have argued that increases in immigrant concentration in communities 
are usually associated with economic benefits and improvement within family structures. 
Additionally, scholars have theorized that all individuals residing in communities with a 
large concentration of immigrants will experience crime-reducing benefits. Despite these 
arguments, some scholars have argued that racial and ethnic differences exist within the 
immigration and crime relationship. For example, Xie and Baumer (2018) argued that 
racial and ethnic differences could exist within the immigration and crime relationship 
due to the finding that immigrants are more likely to reside in Black and Latino 
communities than in White communities (Hall, 2013; Velez, 2009; Xie and Baumer, 
2018). Therefore, White individuals, who are segregated from areas with large immigrant 
concentration, may be less likely to experience the crime-reducing effects of 
immigration. Blacks are more likely to experience the crime-reducing benefits of 
immigration, with Hispanics experiencing the most crime-reducing benefits of 
immigration. However, various factors could potentially explain specific racial and ethnic 
variations in family structure and economic factors within the immigrant revitalization 
theory. 
Potential Explanations for Racial and Ethnic Variations in the Family Structure  
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         There is theoretical evidence to suggest that within certain communities, 
immigration can affect the family structure, but not all racial and ethnic groups are 
affected equally. The influx of immigrants from Latin American countries is most likely 
to change the family structure in Hispanic communities because of its large magnitude. In 
2010, about 53% of the foreign-born population in the U.S. was from Latin America 
(Grieco et al., 2012). This disproportionately increases the population size of existing 
Hispanic communities because Hispanic immigrants are inclined to reside in ethnic 
enclaves (Logan, Zhang, and Alba, 2002; Ramey, 2013). An ethnic enclave is usually a 
community distinguished by a large presence of residents of the same ethnicity and 
exhibits strong social and economic ties between residents (Ramey, 2013; Velez, 2009). 
Furthermore, immigrant social networks have been found to lead Hispanic immigrants to 
ethnic communities where their friends and family reside (Xie, 2010). A population 
increase in Hispanic communities should lead to an increase in the pool of potential 
marital partners, which in turn should improve family structure (Fossett and Kiecolt, 
1990; Lichter, Kephart, and Landry, 1992; Lichter, Carmalt, and Qian, 2011).  
Black and White immigrant groups make up smaller portions of the U.S. 
immigrant population. Therefore, Black and White communities may not experience 
significant increases in population size (Pew Research Center, 2018). In 2016, about 9% 
of the foreign-born population was black (Pew Research Center, 2018) and about 13% of 
the foreign-born population in the U.S. in 2016 were from Europe or Canada (Pew 
Research Center, 2018). Without large influxes of Black and White immigrants, it can be 
hypothesized that Black and White communities may not be experiencing significant 
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increases in population size. Thus, changes in the family structure may not materialize in 
White and Black communities.  
The sense of family obligation and pronuptial normative beliefs may also be a 
theoretical explanation for racial differences in the family structure. Latinos uphold 
family values by maintaining positive relationships with family members and addressing 
the needs of the family before individual needs (Oropesa and Gorman, 2000). And, 
according to Keefe et al. (1979), Hispanic families are cohesive groups of family 
members who are sources of support and protection. Given the theoretical arguments 
stating that Hispanics value the social institution of family greatly, one can theorize that 
Hispanic family structures may experience increases in levels of two-parent families and 
low divorce rates as a result of immigration. Furthermore, Oropesa and Gorman (2000) 
argue that the small proportion of Black and White immigrants is theorized to exert a 
weak influence on pronuptial normative beliefs, which in turn does not significantly alter 
family structure for Whites and Blacks.  
In addition to the supply of potential marital partners and family values, the 
economic and social standing of individuals must also be taken into account as they affect 
family structure. Individuals who are searching for a potential marital partner might make 
their selection based on certain characteristics, such as education and financial 
background. Education is important for individuals who are searching for potential 
partners because it is an indicator of socioeconomic status and social capital (Lewis and 
Oppenheimer, 2000). However, if there is a lack of suitable partners then marriage may 
be threatened. In other words, the quality of potential spouses may theoretically influence 
family structure (South and Lloyd, 1992). However, given that education and income 
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gaps between racial and ethnic groups exist, there might be differences across racial and 
ethnic groups in terms of preferences.  
 Multiple studies have found that the appeal of potential marital partners is 
positively related to higher socioeconomic status and higher-income/economic security. 
Broman (1993) argued that the poor educational and financial status of Blacks could lead 
to economic uncertainty for Black individuals. As a result, Black individuals may 
experience fewer improvements in family structure due to lower-income and poor 
financial security (Broman, 1993; South and Lloyd, 1992). Scholars have also 
characterized Hispanics as having high poverty levels and low levels of education and 
earnings compared to Whites (Oropesa, Lichter, and Anderson, 1994; Raley et al., 2004). 
As a result of the low socioeconomic status associated with Hispanics, Hispanics may 
experience restrictions on marital opportunities. Whites, however, are theorized to enjoy 
few constraints on the availability of suitable potential spouses due to a higher 
socioeconomic status.  
 In addition to the suitability of available marital partners, changes in women’s 
perceptions of marriage have also been argued to influence family structure. Increasing 
educational opportunities and financial independence have led women to not get married 
or at least delay the marriage (South, 1993). The incentive for women to marry is reduced 
with increasing educational opportunities and financial independence because these 
factors decrease the financial motivation to have a spouse (Oropesa, Lichter, and 
Anderson, 1994). While this theory could be applied to all racial and ethnic groups 
equally, the socioeconomic status of Blacks and Hispanics differs from Whites, which 
could lead to racial and ethnic differences in women’s perceptions of marriage. As stated 
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before, Hispanics and Blacks experience low levels of education and high levels of 
poverty, which could influence the financial motivation to have a spouse and ultimately 
change Black and Hispanic women’s perceptions of marriage (Broman, 1993; Oropesa, 
Lichter, and Anderson, 1994; Raley et al., 2004). 
Potential Explanations for Racial and Ethnic Variations in Economic Factors  
Immigrant revitalization theory argues that large concentrations of immigrants 
lead to economic growth, yet some scholars argue that not all racial and ethnic groups 
experience the benefits of economic revitalization associated with immigration. Reed and 
Danziger (2007) argue that natives could benefit economically from immigrants since 
immigrants may increase the wages of natives. However, it is also possible that 
immigrants could economically harm natives by reducing their wages and employment 
opportunities (Raphael and Ronconi, 2007; Reed and Danziger, 2007). More specifically, 
an influx of immigrants could lead to the displacement of low-skilled workers 
(Waldinger, 1997).  
Reed and Danziger (2007) argue that since blacks have less education than 
whites, influxes of immigrants are more likely to negatively affect blacks. Blacks with 
low levels of education are found to have low-skilled jobs, but immigrants have also been 
found to be concentrated in the low-skilled labor market (Reed and Danziger, 2007). 
Furthermore, immigrants have lower levels of education, which theoretically makes them 
suitable substitutes for low-skilled Blacks (Reed and Danziger, 2007). Additionally, low-
skilled Blacks are less skilled compared to low-skilled Whites, which further led 
researchers to posit that Blacks will experience the negative impacts of immigration more 
than low-skilled Whites (Blau and Mackie, 2016). Therefore, influxes of immigrants are 
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likely leading low-skilled Blacks to compete with immigrants for low-skilled job 
opportunities (Reed and Danziger, 2007).  
Hispanics are less likely to be affected by the increase in immigration as they can 
leverage the support that ethnic enclaves provide. Hispanics utilize the economic ties 
within co-ethnic communities to obtain jobs. For example, Hispanic individuals within 
ethnic enclaves receive co-ethnic support in the form of information regarding job 
opportunities (Waldinger, 1997; Xie et al., 2018). Therefore, the co-ethnic support 
provided to Hispanic immigrants regarding job opportunities leads us to believe that 
Hispanics are positively impacted by immigration.  
In summary, immigrants are most likely to compete with low-skilled Blacks, 
diminishing the likelihood that Blacks may experience the economic benefits usually 
associated with an increase in immigration. Thus, the crime-reducing effects of 
immigration may not be experienced by Blacks. More specifically, the immigrant 
concentration may theoretically exert a weak effect on crime for Blacks due to increased 
competition within the labor market and reduced wages. Whites and Hispanics are 
theorized to not be negatively impacted by increases in immigration because Hispanics 
have access to co-ethnic support and Whites do not directly compete with immigrants for 
jobs given their higher levels of education.  
 
SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO FAMILY STRUCTURE 
Immigrant revitalization is theoretically linked to economic growth and 
improvements in the family structure, although recent studies have not directed sufficient 
attention to family structure. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a, 2010b) conducted two 
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studies investigating the effect of Hispanic immigration on economic factors and 
homicide for Blacks and Whites. Also, Xie and Baumer (2018) evaluated the impact of 
competition within the labor market on the immigration and crime relationship. These 
studies have provided important information on the immigration and crime relationship 
with regards to economic factors and have provided theoretical clarification. However, 
family structure is theorized to be as equally important as economic factors and little 
research has evaluated the impact of immigration on family structure and crime, 
especially across different racial and ethnic groups. A study analyzing the impact of 
immigration on family structure and crime across different racial and ethnic groups 
would be advantageous because it would provide additional theoretical clarification with 
regards to the racial invariance hypothesis and immigrant revitalization theory.  
 
IMMIGRANT DESTINATIONS 
Scholars have recently considered the effect of immigrant destinations on crime. 
Towards the end of the 20th century, immigrant settlement patterns were changing with 
immigrants beginning to settle in new destinations. New destination neighborhoods are 
defined as neighborhoods with an immigrant population below the national average, and 
the immigrant population growth rate is above the national average growth rate (Suro and 
Singer, 2002; Xie et al., 2018; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Scholars have found that recently 
arriving immigrants and immigrants who were leaving traditional destinations began 
settling in areas with a very weak co-ethnic presence (Ramey, 2013). Traditional 
destinations are areas in which the immigrant population exceeds the national average 
(Suro and Singer, 2002; Xie et al., 2018; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Neighborhoods and 
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cities across various parts of the US were changing as a result of immigrants increasingly 
settling in new destinations.  
There are several possible explanations for shifts in immigrant settlement 
patterns. One reason for the change in immigrant settlement patterns could be due to 
robust labor markets in new destination areas, which possibly attracted immigrants who 
were looking for economic opportunities (Shihadeh and Barranco, 2010). New 
immigrants could view traditional destinations as a highly competitive environment 
because of a large number of low-skilled workers, thus making traditional destinations 
unsuitable (Shihadeh and Barranco, 2010; Harris and Feldmeyer, 2013). New destination 
areas may have less competition among low-skilled laborers, which could make these 
areas appealing to new immigrants (Harris and Feldmeyer, 2013). Additionally, recently 
arriving immigrants could be avoiding traditional destinations as a result of increased 
immigration enforcement (Feldmeyer et al., 2015). While the reasons why immigrant 
settlement patterns are changing is important, this study is concerned with immigrant 
destination types because of the neighborhood context.  
Taking into account the type of destinations in which immigrants settle into is 
important because scholars believe there are differences in context between the different 
destinations. Certain destinations may be receptive to immigrants and try to assist them 
socially and economically. Traditional destinations are considered receptive 
neighborhoods and may encourage the development of strong social ties and economic 
growth within immigrant neighborhoods. A large immigrant concentration in traditional 
destination neighborhoods could increase community cohesion, strengthen social 
institutions, and reinforce attachment to the labor market, all of which help increase 
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social control and reduce crime (Feldmeyer, 2009; Lee et al., 2001; Ousey and Kurbin, 
2009; Xie and Baumer, 2018). However, some destinations may not be receptive to 
immigrants and lack the appropriate resources needed to help immigrants integrate into 
the community (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Ramey, 2013). 
The social, economic, and political environment in new destination areas may 
differ from those in traditional destination areas, and the differences could disrupt the 
revitalization of neighborhoods (Painter-Davis and Harris, 2016; Ramey, 2013). New 
destination neighborhoods lack the social control that traditional destination 
neighborhoods experience because immigrants in new destinations may not have access 
to social resources and may not experience community cohesion, which impacts the 
ability of immigrants to revitalize neighborhoods (Ramey, 2013). New destination 
neighborhoods may not have an adequate number of immigrants to result in community 
revitalization, leading to only a small reduction in crime (Shihadeh and Winters, 2010; 
Xie and Baumer, 2018; Xie et al., 2018).  
An additional destination type to take into account is low immigration destination 
areas. Low immigration destination neighborhoods are characterized as neighborhoods 
that have a small immigrant population and the immigrant population growth rate is also 
small (Xie et al., 2018; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Theoretically, these neighborhoods lack 
the community organization and strong social institutions that traditional destination 
neighborhoods have and may have weak social control. Additionally, new destinations 
are in a better position than low immigration destination because the immigrant 
population is growing in emerging destinations, which means that these emerging 
destinations will experience improvement in social factors and social control. Given the 
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contextual differences between different immigrant destinations, destinations will be 
analyzed to determine if there are any differences between them with regards to the 
effects of immigrant concentration and family disruption on homicide victimization. 
Scholars claim that certain immigrant destination types should experience 
reductions in crime when compared to others due to differences in social support and 
economic opportunities. Traditional destinations have larger immigrant populations than 
new destinations, which make traditional destinations more likely to experience 
reductions in crime as a result of strong social support networks and economic 
conditions. Despite new destinations having small immigrant populations, new 
destinations are experiencing large increases in their immigrant populations, which 
should lead to improvements in social ties and economic opportunities. With 
improvements in social ties and economic opportunities, new destinations should also 
experience reductions in crime. low immigration destination areas, however, may not 
experience improvements in social ties or economic conditions as a result of very small 
immigrant populations and small immigrant population growth rates. Thus, low 
immigration areas should not experience reductions in crime.   
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR RACIAL/ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN THE 
IMMIGRATION-CRIME RELATIONSHIP AND FAMILY STRUCTURE 
Ousey and Kubrin (2018) conducted a meta-analysis of the macro-level studies 
analyzing the immigration and crime relationship. After analyzing 51 articles, Ousey and 
Kubrin (2018) found evidence suggesting a significant negative relationship between 
immigrant concentration and crime, which is consistent with the immigrant revitalization 
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theory. Using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and ACS, Xie 
and Baumer (2018) found evidence implying that neighborhood immigrant concentration 
decreases violent victimization for whites, blacks, and Latinos. However, Latinos 
experience the crime-reducing effects of immigrant concentration more than whites and 
blacks (Xie and Baumer, 2018). Not only do the findings from Xie and Baumer (2018) 
further support the immigrant revitalization theory, the findings suggest that racial and 
ethnic differences exist in the immigrant and crime relationship. Harris and Feldmeyer 
(2013) performed a study highlighting the differential effects of immigration on crime 
across race groups by analyzing the relationship between recent Latino immigration and 
black, white, and Latino crime using arrest data from census places in California, New 
York, and Texas. Empirical evidence showed that there are differences in the 
immigration and crime relationship across race groups. Latino violence and black 
violence were found to be significantly associated with recent Latino immigration, but 
the association between black violence and immigration was weak compared to Latino 
violence (Harris and Feldmeyer, 2013). In addition, white violence and recent Latino 
immigration were weakly related (Harris and Feldmeyer, 2013). Findings from Harris 
and Feldmeyer (2013) show racial and ethnic differences in the immigration and crime 
relationship, which provides support for the theoretical argument that there are racial and 
ethnic differences in the immigration and crime relationship. Stowell and Martinez 
(2009) studied the impact of immigration on homicide between different ethnic groups in 
Miami using data gathered from police records. In their analysis, they found evidence 
suggesting Latino immigration has a stronger negative relationship with homicide than 
non-Latino immigration (Stowell and Martinez, 2009). In summary, empirical studies 
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have shown that racial and ethnic differences exist in the immigration and crime 
relationship. Thus, attention must be directed towards investigating racial and ethnic 
differences in the family structure to better understand the immigration and crime 
relationship.  
There is some evidence to suggest that racial and ethnic differences in the family 
structure could be linked to the pool of potential marital partners and familism. Oropesa 
and Gorman (2000) found that foreign-born Latinos are more likely to hold pronuptial 
normative beliefs than foreign-born Whites. Sabogal et al. (1987) evaluated familism in a 
sample consisting of Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites and found that Hispanics tend 
to be more familistic than non-Hispanic Whites. The findings from these studies support 
the notion that Hispanics have strong pronuptial beliefs and that there are differences in 
familism between different racial and ethnic groups. Given these differences, there could 
be differences in the effect of family structure on homicide victimization across races and 
ethnicities. 
Despite the small number of research articles evaluating the effect of immigration 
on family structure and crime, there are some interesting findings. Feldmeyer (2009) 
studied the relationship between Latino immigration and Latino violence using arrest data 
from California and New York from 1999-2001. Using structural equation models, he 
found evidence suggesting a weak, negative relationship between Latino immigration and 
Latino violence. Additionally, he was able to determine that immigration was related to 
family structure and family structure was related to crime. More specifically, he found 
that the percentage of recent Latino immigrants is negatively related to the percentage of 
Latino female-headed families with children. Additionally, the percentage of Latino 
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female-headed families with children is positively related to Latino crime, leading 
Feldmeyer (2009) to conclude that immigration indirectly reduces Latino crime by 
improving family structure. Ousey and Kurbin (2009) also examined the relationship 
between immigration and crime, but they used crime rate data from across U.S. cities 
from 1980 to 2000. In their first statistical model, they were able to determine that 
increases in the percentage of immigrants in U.S. cities are associated with decreases in 
violent crime (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009). Ousey and Kubrin (2009) then proceeded to test 
explanations for the relationship by evaluating changes in a variety of community 
variables, including labor markets, drug markets, demographics, size of the police force, 
unemployment rate, and family structure. They found that the negative relationship 
between crime and immigration was mainly a result of immigration being negatively 
associated with family structure, which they operationalized as the percent of divorce and 
the percent of single-parent families (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009). As a result of decreased 
family disruption, U.S. cities in their samples experienced lower crime rates. Despite 
Ousey and Kubrin (2009) finding empirical evidence showing that family structure is a 
mediating mechanism in the immigrant revitalization theory, they did not disaggregate by 
race and ethnicity. Not disaggregating by race and ethnicity leaves important questions 
unanswered regarding differences across groups, which have been shown to exist. 
Despite evidence suggesting racial and ethnic differences, some scholars have found 
evidence suggesting that sources of crime tend to be uniform across racial and ethnic 
groups.  
Scholars have long posited that structural factors are related to crime in 
neighborhoods uniformly across racial and ethnic groups. Hernandez et al. (2018) used 
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data from the National Neighborhood Crime Survey, which included information about 
neighborhood property and violent crime across a representative sample of 87 cities, to 
evaluate whether ethno-racial differences in crime at the neighborhood-level are related 
to structural factors. They found evidence showing that the relationship between 
structural factors and neighborhood crime was similar across racial and ethnic groups 
(Hernandez et al., 2018). In the end, the authors state that the evidence supports the 
perspective that types of places influence crime. Peterson and Krivo (1996) used data 
from Columbus, Ohio and found that neighborhood disadvantage increased crime for 
Whites and Blacks. Peterson and Krivo (2010) again found evidence showing that 
disadvantage similarly impacted crime for Whites and Blacks (Hernandez et al., 2018). 
While some scholars strongly support the racial invariance hypothesis, other scholars 
view the evidence as insufficient. Using data from 125 US cities in 1990, Ousey (1999) 
found evidence suggesting that there are racial differences in the impact of neighborhood 
structural factors on crime and states that structural theories require revision to take into 
account racial differences.  
In addition to arguments regarding differences between racial and ethnic groups, 
scholars also argue that there are differences between immigrant destination types due to 
neighborhood context. Several studies have provided empirical evidence in support of the 
theory that destination type has an effect on the immigration and crime relationship. In a 
study evaluating immigration and crime using neighborhood data from across US cities, 
Ramey (2013) found that immigrant concentration is associated with a decrease in crime 
in traditional destination cities. However, immigration was found not to decrease crime 
significantly in new destination cities (Ramey, 2013). An interesting finding in Ramey’s 
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study (2013) was that immigrant concentration is associated with a decrease in crime in 
Latino neighborhoods in new destination cities. Harris and Feldmeyer (2013) also 
investigated the relationship between immigration and crime by traditional and non-
traditional destinations. Using arrest data from New York, California, and Texas, Harris 
and Feldmeyer (2013) discovered that recent Latino immigration is associated with 
increased violence in non-traditional destinations and decreased crime in traditional 
destinations. Lastly, Xie and Baumer (2018) found evidence that certain immigrant 
destinations have an influence on immigration and crime for certain racial groups. 
Despite some scholars finding empirical evidence suggesting an immigrant destination 
effect exists, some scholars have not found evidence suggesting that certain immigrant 
destinations have an influence on crime. For example, Xie et al. (2018) used data from 
the NCVS and ACS to study why there are differences in the risk of violent victimization 
among young Latino adults who reside in new and traditional destination areas. With 
their multi-level data, they found that there was no evidence of destination type effects in 
their total violence models. Thus, the finding from Xie et al. (2018) suggests that the 
context within different immigrant destinations do not influence crime.  
A review of the empirical evidence provides important background information. 
First, differences between destination types exist, which suggests that differences could 
exist within racial and ethnic groups. Second, racial and ethnic differences seem to exist 
within the immigrant and crime relationship, and there is some evidence implying 
racial/ethnic differences within family structure. Lastly, although there is evidence of 
racial/ethnic differences in the immigration and crime relationship, all individuals 
experience a reduction in crime as a result of immigration. While there are numerous 
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studies on immigration and crime, it is still unknown if racial and ethnic differences exist 
with regards to family structure and its impact on the immigration and crime relationship.  
 
EXTENDING PRIOR RESEARCH 
Scholars have analyzed racial and ethnic differences in the immigration and crime 
relationship in general, but little attention has been directed towards specifically 
analyzing racial and ethnic differences in the family structure and how these potential 
differences may impact the immigration and crime relationship. Feldmeyer (2013) found 
evidence suggesting that Hispanic immigration alters Hispanic family structure and is 
important in explaining Hispanic crime. Ousey and Kubrin (2009) also found evidence 
suggesting family structure as a mediating mechanism, which is consistent with the 
immigrant revitalization theory, but did not disaggregate by race and ethnicity. 
Feldmeyer (2013) and Ousey and Kubrin (2009) left unanswered whether changes in 
Black, Hispanic, White family structure play a role in explaining the effect of 
immigration on crime. Theoretical arguments and limited findings from a small body of 
research suggest important racial and ethnic differences in the impact of immigration on 
crime through changes in family structure. Additional research is needed because prior 
articles did not disaggregate family structure by race/ethnicity to evaluate potential racial 
and ethnic differences in the immigration and crime relationship. This study aims to 
analyze how immigration impacts crime across different racial and ethnic groups via 








3. CURRENT STUDY 
  
Past studies have found that immigration reduces crime for the overall population, 
and recently, researchers have realized that racial differences exist within the 
immigration-crime relationship. This study aims to evaluate race and ethnicity 
differences in the immigration-crime relationship. Furthermore, this study investigates 
whether immigration reduces crime by reducing divorce and female-headed households. 
Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and National Vital Statistics 
System (NVSS), this study will determine if changes in immigration at the county-level 
are related to changes in homicide victimizations and if family structure plays a role in 
explaining the immigration-crime relationship. The analysis will be conducted for each 
race and ethnicity group to determine if there are race and ethnicity differences in the 
immigration-crime relationship. Immigrant destination types will also be considered in 
the analysis to determine if context matters. In the end, this study will provide 
clarification on the differential effect of immigration on crime across race and ethnicity 
groups with respect to homicide victimization. 
Hypotheses 
         Overall, racial and ethnic differences may exist within the immigration and crime 
relationship due to differences in residential segregation and the supply of potential 
marital partners. Focusing on racial and ethnic differences in the immigration and crime 
relationship the following hypotheses evolve:  




2. Immigrant concentration will reduce homicide victimizations through changes in 
family disruption in the full sample.  
3. Black immigrant concentration will reduce Black homicide victimizations through 
changes in Black family disruption.  
4. White immigrant concentration will reduce White homicide victimizations 
through changes in White family disruption.  
5. Hispanic immigrant concentration will reduce Hispanic homicide victimizations 
through changes in Hispanic family disruption. 
6. Hispanics will experience a greater reduction in homicide victimizations than 
Blacks and Whites because of changes in family disruption, and Blacks will 
experience a greater reduction in homicide victimization than Whites as a result of 
changes in family disruption. 
7. Across all racial and ethnic groups, traditional and new destinations will 
experience reductions in homicide victimizations as a result of changes in family 











4. DATA AND METHODS 
DATA  
 
National Vital Statistics System 
  
This study will use county-level mortality data from the National Vital Statistics 
System (NVSS) from 2007 and 2017 for the dependent variable. The data were acquired 
from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) at the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC). The NVSS data are beneficial for this research as it provides 
information regarding the victim’s race and ethnicity, allowing for disaggregation by race 
and ethnicity. It also has a larger coverage rate compared to the Supplementary Homicide 
Reports (SHR) (Xie, 2010).  
American Community Survey & U.S. Census Bureau  
This study will use county-level data from the American Community Survey 
(ACS) from for independent and control variables. County variables were lagged by 1 
year before the violence to ensure temporal ordering is aligned with the causal order 
argued in the hypotheses. The main purpose of the ACS will be to provide information on 
independent and control variables. The data were obtained from the American 
FactFinder, which is a U.S. Census website containing various datasets. County-level 
data from the 2000 decennial Census will be used for the independent variables and 
control variables and were obtained from American FactFinder. Interpolation techniques 
will be used to obtain the values of independent and control variables in 2007. 
Unit of Analysis 
Counties are ideal units of analysis for examining immigration and family 
structure because counties provide residents with economic and social opportunities and 
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resources (Xie et al., 2018). Also, counties are defined across the entire US and cover 
both rural and suburban areas (Xie and Baumer, 2018). Counties define geographic areas 
that extend past metropolitan and city boundaries, which is beneficial as they capture 
areas outside urban centers (Xie and Baumer, 2018). Furthermore, counties are preferred 
over census tracts when trying to characterize marriage markets given that individuals 
also search for marital partners outside of their neighborhoods (Xie et al., 2018). Lastly, 
homicide victimization data disaggregated by race and ethnicity from the NVSS were 
measured at the county-level, which is the lowest level of aggregation for NVSS data. 
Therefore, counties are used as the unit of analysis in this study because of data 
availability, coverage of land, and economic and social factors.  
Missing Data 
 There are different sample sizes for different groups because of missing data from 
the decennial census and ACS. Data are missing in the full sample and for Whites, 
Blacks, and Hispanics, but the data are missing to a greater extent for Blacks and 
Hispanics. For Blacks, about 23.5% of data is missing for percent foreign-born, 23% is 
missing for percent of female-headed households, and about 24% is missing for percent 
divorced/separated. For Hispanics, about 17% of the data for the variable percent foreign-
born is missing, 17% is missing for the variable percent divorced/separated, and 9% is 
missing for percent households headed by a female. Despite the missing data, the sample 
sizes are large enough to obtain reliable estimates. The generalizability of the results, 
however, could be called into question given that the missing data reduce the ability to 






The dependent variables will be total, Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic White 
homicide victimization. It will be a count of homicide victims for each group who resided 
in U.S. counties in 2007 and 2017. This study will focus on homicide victimization 
because it is a critically important topic to the public and government officials, and 
homicide measures are relatively accurate.  
Independent Variables 
The first independent variable will be the county immigrant concentration. 
Immigrant concentration is measured as the percentage of the county population that is 
foreign-born, non-Hispanic White foreign-born, Black foreign-born, and Hispanic 
foreign-born. Family disruption will be measured in two ways: percent 
divorced/separated, and percentage of female-headed households. Both measures of 
family disruption will be disaggregated by race and ethnicity (percent non-Hispanic 
White divorced/separated, percent Black divorced/separated, and percent Hispanic 
divorced/separated, percent of non-Hispanic White female-headed households, percent of 
Black female-headed households, and percent of Hispanic female-headed households).  
Immigrant Destination  
 
 Immigrant destination was specifically measured based on the 1990 immigrant 
population and immigrant growth rate from 1990 to 2010 (Suro and Singer, 2002; Xie et 
al., 2018; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Traditional areas are counties with immigrant 
populations that surpassed the national average of immigrant concentration in 1990, 
which was 7.9%. New areas are counties where the immigrant populations were below 
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the immigrant concentration national average in 1990 and the immigrant growth rate was 
higher than the national average growth rate (95.65%) (Suro and Singer, 2002; Xie et al., 
2018; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Low immigration areas are counties where the immigrant 
populations were below the immigrant concentration national in 1990 and the immigrant 
growth rate was lower than the national average growth rate (Suro and Singer, 2002; Xie 
et al., 2018; Xie and Baumer, 2018).  
Control Variables 
The study will include additional individual and county factors as control 
variables, and all control variables will be disaggregated by race and ethnicity. This study 
will control for gender (the percentage of males), population size, age (percentage of 
individuals who are 15-29 years old), percent Black, and percent Hispanic. The 
percentage of Black and Hispanic individuals will control for racial/ethnic differences in 
crime (Xie and Baumer, 2018). The percentage of individuals who are 15-29 years old 
will be a control variable because this age group has been found to experience violent 
crime at higher rates than other age groups (Rand et al., 2007). Gender is also a control 
variable to account for the percentage of the population who are males, given that males 
are victims of crime at a higher rate than women (Lauritsen et al., 2001). An economic 
disadvantage index was created from combining the following variables: unemployment 
(percent unemployed), poverty (the percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line), education (the percentage of the population 25 years old and over without a high 
school diploma), and household median income. The economic disadvantage index was 
created by summing the z-scores of the four variables. Economic disadvantage is 
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included as a control variable to hold constant theoretical factors that are considered 
alternative influences in the immigrant revitalization theory.  
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY  
  
 Given that the dependent variable is a count of homicide victimizations across 
racial and ethnic groups, I will evaluate how changes in immigration influenced changes 
in homicide victimization by race and ethnicity through a series of negative binomial 
regression models. To evaluate if family structure/disruption plays a role in the 
immigration-crime relationship, I will be evaluating changes from 2007, which will serve 
as the first time point (T1), and 2017, the second time point (T2). Furthermore, given the 
interest in the relation between the change in immigration and family structure and the 
change in homicide victimization, county and year fixed effects will be used. By 
concentrating on within county change, fixed effects will remove the effects of all time-
constant factors related to crime that could potentially bias the models. Using year fixed-
effects will account for any unobserved trends or factors that could have influenced 
homicide victimization over time. First, a full sample in which all homicides were 
aggregated together was created to evaluate the relationship between immigration and 
homicide victimization for all individuals. I then built individual models for Whites, 
Blacks, and Hispanics to evaluate racial differences in the immigrant revitalization theory 
and if family structure/disruption was influential. The full sample models use counties 
with a population of at least 2,500 individuals. Race/ethnicity specific models will use 
counties with a population of at least 1,000 individuals. Also, a series of negative 
binomial regression models with county and year fixed-effects will be used to determine 
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if immigrant destination type is a moderating factor. I will also use cross-sectional 
negative binomial models to evaluate the relationship between immigration and crime 
and if immigration reduces crime through family disruption. The models were tested for 























The descriptive statistics for the full sample are in table 1. The findings show that 
the average number of homicides in US counties increased from 6.2 in 2007 to 6.6 in 
2017. For Whites, the mean number of homicides also increased from 1.92 in 2007 to 
2.016 in 2017 (table 2). Blacks also experienced an increase in homicide counts from 
2.867 in 2007 to 3.25 in 2017 (table 4). Hispanics, however, experienced a very small 
decrease in the average number of homicides with an average of 1.186 in 2007 to 1.097 
in 2017 (table 3). Overall, Blacks had the highest averages in homicide counts followed 
by Whites and Hispanics with the lowest averages in homicide counts. To account for 
population changes, homicide rates were computed for each sample at 2007 and 2017. In 
the full sample, the mean homicide rate in 2007 was 0.0404 per 1,000 individuals and 
0.048 per 1,000 individuals in 2017. For Whites in counties with a population of at least 
1,000 individuals, the mean homicide rate in 2007 was 0.028 per 1,000 individuals and 
0.034 per 1,000 individuals. For Blacks in counties with a population of at least 1,000 
individuals, the mean homicide rate in 2007 was 0.132 per 1,000 individuals and 0.164 
per 1,000 individuals. For Blacks in counties with a population of at least 1,000 
individuals, the mean homicide rate in 2007 was 0.06 per 1,000 individuals and 0.047 per 
1,000 individuals. 
In the global dataset, the percentage of foreign-born increased from 4.063 in 2007 
to 4.648 in 2017. Whites experienced a slight increase in the percentage of foreign-born 
when the percentage rose from 1.263 in 2007 to 1.353 in 2017. Blacks experienced a 
large increase in the percentage of foreign-born when the percentage rose from 4.176 in 
2007 to 7.683 in 2017. For Hispanics, the average percentage of foreign-born decreased 
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from 30.18 in 2007 to 26.445 in 2017. Although the percentage of foreign-born decreased 
for Hispanics, they still had the highest averages of percent foreign-born with regards to 
magnitude. Also, Blacks had larger percentages of foreign-born than Whites at both time 
periods.  
With regards to family disruption, data from the full sample shows that percent 
divorced/separated and percent of female-headed households increased from 2007 to 
2017. For example, percent divorced/separated increased from 12.4% in 2007 to 13.7% in 
2017. Percent of female-headed households increased from 10.9% in 2007 to 11.2% in 
2017. The data also show that there are differences in the changes of percent 
divorced/separated and percent female-headed households across racial/ethnic groups. 
Percent divorced/separated for Whites increased from 12.4% in 2007 to 13.8% in 2017. 
However, percent of female-headed households for Whites remained virtually the same 
with an average of 8.5% in 2007 and an average of 8.8% in 2017. Hispanics experience 
increases in percent divorced/separated and percent of female-headed households from 
2007 to 2017. The percent of divorced/separated for Hispanics rose from 10.9% in 2007 
to 12% in 2017. The percent of female-headed households for Hispanics rose from 14.4% 
in 2007 to 15.3%. Blacks did not experience a change in percent divorced/separated. The 
percentage of Blacks who were divorced/separated was 15.4% in 2007 and in 2017 it was 
15.3%. Interestingly, Blacks experienced a small decrease in the percent of female-
headed households. Percent of female-headed households was 24.1% in 2007 and it 
decreased to 21.4% in 2007. Despite the 2.7% percent decrease in the percent of female-
headed households for Blacks, Blacks had the highest averages for the percentage of 




The analysis of results entails the comparison of two sets of regression models. 
Models in the first set contain only percent foreign-born and control variables. These 
models are the baseline models, which show the effect of immigrant concentration while 
holding control variables constant. The second set of models contain percent foreign-born 
and control variables, but also contain measures of family disruption. If the association 
between immigrant concentration and homicide victimization is attributable to family 
disruption, controlling for family disruption should weaken or eliminate the effect of 
immigrant concentration in the models.  
 Table 14 shows the two regression models for the full sample, Whites, Blacks, 
and Hispanics. Findings from table 14 are used to test hypotheses 1 through 6. For each 
sample, model one is the baseline model. Model two, under each racial and ethnic group, 
includes family disruption measures. Results from model one for the full sample shows 
that immigrant concentration has a significant negative coefficient, which supports 
hypothesis 1 (b=-0.0837, p<0.01)1. A one-standard-deviation increase in percent foreign-
born would decrease the homicide victimization rate in the full sample by 8% 
(=100*[exp(-0.0837)-1]). Once family disruption measures were controlled for, the direct 
effect of immigrant concentration on homicide victimizations changes very little between 
models one and two. Immigrant concentration in model two has a coefficient of -0.0810 
 
1 Percent Hispanic was removed from models using data from the full sample because there was a 
high correlation between percent Hispanic and percent foreign-born (r=0.67). 
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and has a p-value of less than 0.01. Thus, family disruption does not appear to play a role 
in reducing homicide victimizations2. 
Results from model one for the White sample indicates that immigrant 
concentration has a significant negative coefficient (b=-0.113, p<0.01). Model 2 for the 
White sample shows that after family disruption variables are added, the immigrant 
concentration variable remains statistically significant and changes very little when 
compared to the coefficient in model one (b=-0.102, p<0.01). This finding from the 
White sample implies that family disruption does not play a significant role in the 
immigration and crime relationship3.  
When reviewing the results from model one of the Black sample, the coefficient 
for immigrant concentration is statistically significant and is in the negative direction (b=-
0.0294, p<0.01). After controlling for family disruption in model 2 of the Black sample, 
immigrant concentration remains statistically significant and does not substantially 
weaken (b=-0.0302, p<0.01). Therefore, these findings suggest that family disruption 
does not play a role in the immigrant and crime relationship for Blacks4.  
Findings from the Hispanic model suggest that there is no evidence suggesting 
that immigration is related to a reduction in crime, nor that family disruption plays a role 
in the immigration and crime relationship. In model one of the Hispanics sample, the 
coefficient for immigrant concentration is not statistically significant, but it is in the 
 
2 Even when percent divorced and percent female-headed households are added individually to 
the model, immigrant concentration remains statistically significant and is reduced very 
minimally.  
3 With the individual addition of percent divorced and percent female-headed households to 
model one, percent foreign-born remains statistically significant and the coefficient changes very 
little.  
4 Immigrant concentration was not reduced substantially and remains statistically significant with 
percent divorced and percent female-headed households added individually to model one.  
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negative direction (b=-0.00236). In model two, after the inclusion of family disruption 
measures, immigrant concentration remains non-significant and is now in the positive 
direction (b=0.00524).  
Findings from table 14 indicate that there is a lack of support for hypotheses 2 
through 6. There is, however, support for hypothesis one, which was concerned with 
whether immigrant concentration reduces homicide victimizations for all individuals. 
There is no evidence to suggest that changes in family disruption serve as a main process 
behind the immigration and crime relationship in the full sample, White sample, Black 
sample, and Hispanic sample.  
Tables 15, 16, and 17 report the results for testing hypothesis 7, which states that 
crime in traditional and new destinations should decrease across all racial/ethnic groups 
as a result of changes in family disruption brought upon changes in immigrant 
concentration. There are three destination types: traditional, new, and low immigration 
areas. Under each destination type, there are two models. The first model is a baseline 
model without family disruption measures and the second model is the baseline model 
with family disruption measures added to it. Table 15 displays the results for the White 
sample by destination type. Reviewing the results from table 15 shows that immigrant 
concentration in traditional areas in the White sample is not statistically significant in 
models one and two. Immigrant concentration in new destination areas is not statistically 
significant in model one and model 2, but the coefficients in both models are in the 
negative direction. Given that immigrant concentration is not statistically significant in 
traditional and new areas for Whites, it appears that immigration is not associated with a 
significant reduction in crime and changes in family disruption do not play a role in the 
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immigration and crime relationship. However, immigrant concentration in low 
immigration areas is statistically significant and is in the negative direction (b=-0.295, 
p<0.01). Model two, which contains family disruption variables, shows that the 
immigrant concentration variable remains statistically significant and is in the negative 
direction. Given that immigrant concentration in model 2 remains statistically significant 
after the addition of family disruption variables, family disruption does not seem to play 
an important role in reducing crime within the immigration and crime relationship for 
Whites in low immigration areas.  
 The results from table 16 indicate that immigrant concentration in traditional 
areas in the Black sample is not statistically significant. After the including family 
disruption variables, immigrant concentration remains non-significant, but the magnitude 
for immigrant concentration in traditional areas in the Black sample does decrease very 
slightly (model 1: b=0.0333, model 2: b=0.0307). Immigrant concentration in new 
destination areas is also not statistically significant. Once family disruption is controlled 
for, the coefficient for immigrant concentration in new destinations for the Black sample 
does not reduce in magnitude and remains insignificant. Thus, immigration in new areas 
does not reduce crime via alteration in family disruption. Immigrant concentration in low 
immigration areas in the Black sample is statistically significant and is in the negative 
direction (b=-0.0695, p<0.01). Model two shows that the immigrant concentration 
variable remains statistically significant and in the negative direction, but the magnitude 
of the coefficient was not weakened (b=-0.0729, p<0.01). Findings from the Black 
sample offer no support for the hypothesis that immigration affects crime by changing 
family structure in the Black sample.  
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Table 17 shows the results from the Hispanic sample across three different 
destination types to determine if there is support for hypothesis 7. In traditional 
destinations, immigrant concentration is not statistically significant in model one. 
Immigrant concentration is also not statistically significant in model two once family 
disruption measures were included. Also, the magnitude of the coefficient for immigrant 
concentration in traditional areas does not decrease after family disruption is controlled 
for. In new destinations, immigrant concentration is not statistically significant. Model 
two also shows that immigrant concentration is not statistically significant and the 
magnitude of the coefficient does not diminish after controlling for family disruption. 
This finding implies that immigration is not associated with a reduction in crime in new 
areas for Hispanics and family disruption is not an intervening factor in the immigrant 
and crime relationship. In low immigration areas, immigrant concentration is statistically 
significant (b=-0.0916, p<0.01). Looking at the results in model two for low immigration 
areas for Hispanics, one can see that immigrant concentration stays statistically 
significant after the inclusion of family disruption variables, but the magnitude of the 
coefficient for immigrant concentration does diminish slightly (b=-0.0864, p<0.05). 
However, given that immigrant concentration remains statistically significant after the 
inclusion of family disruption variables, immigration does not reduce crime through 
changes in family structure in low immigration areas for Hispanics.  
Findings from tables 15, 16, and 17 show interesting results. First, immigrant 
concentration is not significant in traditional and new destination areas. Immigrant 
concentration, however, was found to be statistically significant in low immigration 
areas. Second, even evaluating the immigration and crime relationship across racial and 
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ethnic groups by destination type reveals that family disruption does not play a role in the 
immigration and crime relationship. These results do not support hypothesis 7. 
Cross-Sectional Models 
The method of comparing two sets of regression models to determine whether 
family disruption plays a role in the immigration and crime relationship will be used 
again for analyzing the results from cross-sectional models, which used data from 2007. 
Table 18 shows the results from cross-sectional models using data from the full, White, 
Black, and Hispanic samples. Results from model one for the full sample shows that 
immigrant concentration has a significant, positive coefficient (b=0.0238, p<0.01). When 
family disruption measures are added to the baseline model, immigrant concentration 
remains statistically significant and in the positive direction (b=0.0245, p<0.01). Results 
from model one for the White sample indicates that immigrant concentration has a 
significant negative coefficient (b=-0.0311, p<0.01). Model 2 for the White sample 
shows that immigrant concentration is no longer statistically significant once family 
disruption variables are added to the baseline model. This finding from the White sample 
indicates that family disruption plays a role in the immigration and crime relationship in 
the cross-sectional model. The coefficient for immigrant concentration in model one from 
the Black sample is statistically significant and in the negative direction (b=-0.0137, 
p<0.01). When family disruption variables are included in model 2, immigrant 
concentration is no longer statistically significant, but it remains in the negative direction. 
These findings suggest that family disruption does not play a role in the immigrant and 
crime relationship for Blacks. Results from the Hispanic models show no evidence 
suggesting that immigrant concentration is associated with a reduction in homicide 
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victimizations and there is no evidence suggesting that family disruption plays a role in 
the immigration and crime relationship because the coefficient for immigrant 
concentration is not significant in model one and two. Findings from the cross-sectional 
models support the argument that family disruption plays a role in the immigration and 
crime relationship for Whites and Blacks, but there was no support for this argument 
when using data from the full sample and Hispanic sample.  
Tables 19, 20, and 21 show the results from cross-sectional models for Whites, 
Blacks, and Hispanics, respectively, by destination types. There are two models for each 
destination type. Model one is a baseline model without family disruption measures. 
Model two is the baseline model with family disruption variables included. Table 19 
displays the results for the White sample by destination type and model one shows that 
immigrant concentration in traditional areas is statistically significant and is in the 
negative direction (b=-0.0563, p<0.01). Model 2 in table 19 also shows that immigrant 
concentration is no longer statistically significant once family disruption variables are 
controlled for, which indicates that family disruption plays a role in the immigration and 
crime relationship for Whites in traditional destination areas. Immigrant concentration in 
new destination areas is not statistically significant in model one and model two. 
Immigrant concentration in low immigration areas is statistically significant and is in the 
positive direction (b=0.0685, p<0.05). In model two, which controls for family disruption 
variables, immigrant concentration is no longer statistically significant. Results from 
White cross-sectional models moderated by destination type show some evidence to 
suggest that family disruption does play a role in the immigration and crime relationship 
and that context does matter.   
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 Results from table 20 indicate that in traditional areas, Black immigrant 
concentration is significantly and negatively associated with Black homicide 
victimizations (b=-0.0319, p<0.01). After controlling for family disruption variables, 
immigrant concentration remains statistically significant and in the negative direction 
(b=-0.0198, p<0.01). Immigrant concentration in new destination areas in the Black 
sample is not statistically significant in model one and two. Additionally, immigrant 
concentration in low immigration areas is statistically insignificant in models one and 
two. Results from Black cross-sectional models by destination type provide no evidence 
to suggest that context matters nor do they suggest that family disruption plays a vital 
role in the immigration and crime relationship.  
Table 21 shows the results from cross-sectional models using data from the 
Hispanic sample across three different destination types. In traditional destinations, 
immigrant concentration is not statistically significant in model one. However, immigrant 
concentration is statistically significant and in the negative direction in model two when 
family disruption variables were added to the baseline model. In new destinations, 
immigrant concentration is not statistically significant in models one and two. In low 
immigration areas, immigrant concentration is not statistically significant in models one 
and two. Cross-sectional models did not show any evidence to suggest that context 
matters when using data from the Hispanic sample.  
Findings from longitudinal models show interesting results. First, immigrant 
concentration is not significant in traditional and new destination areas. Immigrant 
concentration, however, was found to be statistically significant in low immigration 
areas. Second, even evaluating the immigration and crime relationship across racial and 
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ethnic groups by destination type reveals that changes in family disruption do not play a 
role in the immigration and crime relationship. These results do not support hypothesis 7. 
Findings from cross-sectional models differ from the results in longitudinal models. The 
cross-sectional models indicated that there is support for the argument that family 
disruption plays a role in the immigration and crime relationship in the White and Black 
samples. Data from the White sample also suggest that context matters when evaluating 
the crime and immigration relationship, but there was no evidence to suggest that context 
matters in the Black and Hispanic samples. Although I controlled for a variety of known 
correlates of crime, there could be unobserved factors that are related to immigration, 

















 Researchers have long posited that immigration reduces crime in the US (Lee et 
al., 2001; Ousey and Kurbin, 2009; Xie and Baumer, 2018). Prior studies, however, did 
not disaggregate their data by race and ethnicity, leading to the inability to detect any 
potential racial and ethnic differences because they relied on aggregate-level data 
recorded by law enforcement agencies (Xie and Baumer, 2018). Using the immigrant 
revitalization theory as the main theoretical framework for this study and homicide 
victimization data, this study aims to evaluate race and ethnicity differences in the 
immigration-crime relationship and if immigration reduces crime through changes in 
family structure by reducing divorce rates and female-headed households.  
Before analyzing the disaggregated data, longitudinal models using data from the 
full sample were used to determine if immigrant concentration reduces crime and if 
immigration reduces crime through changes in family disruption. I found that immigrant 
concentration is associated with a significant reduction in homicide victimizations, which 
is consistent with findings from previous studies. Results from the full sample also show 
that changes in family disruption do not play a role in the immigration and crime 
relationship. Longitudinal models using disaggregated homicide data showed that 
immigrant concentration reduces homicide counts for Blacks and Whites. Immigrant 
concentration was not associated with reductions in homicides for Hispanics, which 
contradicts findings from past research articles (Feldmeyer, 2009; Xie and Baumer, 
2018). While this finding may be contradictory to past findings, it does show that 
Hispanic immigration is not associated with increases with homicides, which should help 
alleviate misconceptions that Hispanic immigrants increase crime. The findings also 
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show that immigration does not reduce crime through changes in family disruption. 
When analyzing the data disaggregated by race and ethnicity I found interesting results: 
family disruption does not play a major role in the immigration and crime relationship for 
Whites, Blacks, or Hispanics. Therefore, these findings do not support the hypotheses 
made in this paper. More importantly, the findings from this study do not support one of 
the hypothesized mechanisms stated in the immigrant revitalization theory: immigration 
reduces crime through improvements in family disruption. This finding is important 
because it suggests that there is no evidence in the data supporting one of the main 
mechanisms outlined in the immigrant revitalization theory. Since there is no evidence 
suggesting that improvements in family disruption plays a role in the immigration and 
crime relationship, future studies should perhaps evaluate mechanisms beyond family 
structure. Some mechanisms that go beyond improvements in family disruption are 
sources of formal social control, such as community organizations, churches, and 
schools. It is theorized that immigrants revitalize communities by increasing community 
involvement in community organizations, churches, and schools, which then should 
increase formal social control. An additional mechanism of interest is immigrant political 
opportunities, which could strengthen social control within areas with a large immigrant 
concentration. Scholars have theorized that areas with immigrant political opportunities 
should increase trust between officials and immigrants, which should encourage 
immigrants to engage in political affairs and increasing social organization (Lyons et al., 
2013). Also, immigrant political opportunities allows areas with a large immigrant 
concentration to exert public social control and obtain the resources they need to counter 
crime (Lyons et al., 2013). Future studies should also evaluate economic mechanisms 
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when investigating the immigration and crime relationship given extensive theoretical 
arguments suggesting economic conditions are linked to immigration and crime 
relationship (Lee et al., 2001; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Xie and Baumer, 2018). 
Cross-sectional models displayed some interesting findings. Cross-sectional 
models using data from White and Black samples in 2007 provide findings suggesting 
that family disruption plays a role in the crime and immigration and crime relationship. 
There also is evidence  indicating that destination types matter in the White sample. 
However, there was no evidence showing that family disruption plays a role in the crime 
and immigration relationship in the Hispanic sample nor were there any findings 
suggesting that immigration destination types matter in the Hispanic and Black samples. 
The foreign-born coefficient for the full sample is positive and goes against theory and 
past findings. One potential reason for this positive coefficient is that increases in 
immigration could increase competition for low-skilled labor and reduce wages for 
individuals. If the low-skilled labor market is saturated with individuals looking for work 
then competition for labor should increase and wages could be reduced, which could lead 
to increases in crime (Shihadeh and Barranco, 2010). Perhaps, increases in immigrants no 
longer produce crime-reducing benefits at a certain point due to reasons unknown to 
scholars (Xie and Baumer, 2018). While there are potential explanations for this finding, 
findings from cross-sectional models should be viewed with caution because unobserved 
factors related to immigration, crime, and family structure could be biasing the results. 
Overall, the findings from cross-sectional models provide some support for the family 
disruption argument of the immigrant revitalization theory and provide limited support 
46 
 
for the argument that destination types matter when evaluating the immigration and crime 
relationship.   
Scholars have argued that certain immigrant destination types should experience 
greater reductions in crime than others due to differences in social support, economic 
opportunities, and reception of immigrants in destination areas. Surprisingly, the results 
show that immigrant concentration significantly reduces crime in low immigration areas. 
One potential reason for this interesting finding might be that low immigration areas may 
have less competition among low-skilled laborers, which allow immigrants in low 
immigration areas to support the economy by providing low-skilled labor, increasing 
demand for goods, and consumption of services. Another possible reason for this finding 
is that the context of reception is different in low immigration areas than hypothesized by 
scholars. There was no evidence to suggest that immigration reduces crime in traditional 
or new destination areas, which is very different from findings from past research articles 
that found evidence suggesting reductions in crime in traditional and new destinations.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that immigrant concentration 
in traditional and new destination areas reduces crime through changes in family 
disruption, which further supports the notion that other mechanisms might be responsible 
for the reductions in homicides. 
Additional work will be needed to further investigate if racial and ethnic 
differences exist within the immigration and crime relationship. One avenue for future 
research would be to expand the definition of immigrant concentration. Scholars have 
argued that treating immigrants as a homogenous group of individuals can be problematic 
because this approach neglects to recognize the diversity that exists between immigrant 
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groups (Kubrin et al., 2018). Kubrin et al. (2018) state that the reasons immigrants 
migrate could vary across country of origin or race and ethnicity. Furthermore, scholars 
have determined that the motivation to migrate are associated with criminal behavior, 
which further emphasizes the need for a more inclusive definition of immigrant 
concentration (Kubrin et al., 2018). Therefore, it might be ideal to use ethnicity or 
country of origin as an alternative measure for foreign-born. Also, language spoken at 
home could be used as another alternative measure for foreign-born. Data regarding 
language at home is provided by data gathered by the U.S. Census. The data regarding 
language spoken at home provides information regarding the ability to speak English well 
and which language is spoken at home. Another avenue of future research would be to 
include more data. The data used in this study, which is from 2007 to 2017, has provided 
important information, but including more historical data we could provide a better 
perspective of how immigration has affected crime over the years. Also, future studies 
could use a dependent variable other than homicide victimization to determine if the 
immigration and crime relationship with an emphasis on race/ethnicity and family 
structure stays the same or changes. Lastly, future studies could consider using sex ratio 
as an independent variable because differing sex ratios can create unique contexts in 
which men and women interact with each other, which could affect family 
structure/disruption (Messner and Sampson, 1991). Also, including sex ratio as an 
independent variable could help explain whether immigration impacts family structure by 
changing the availability of potential marital partners, which is vital in investigating 
possible mechanisms through which immigration reduces crime in geographic areas.  
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In conclusion, the data has shown support for the immigration and crime 
relationship, but no evidence was found showing that family disruption plays a 
significant role in the immigration and crime relationship. I also found that there are 
differences in immigration destinations within racial and ethnic groups, with new 
destinations experiencing decreases in crime as a result of immigration. Additionally, the 
data provide qualitative support for the racial invariance hypothesis. However, future 
studies could use a quantitative method to further establish support for the racial 
invariance hypothesis as suggested by Velez (2018). Findings from this study provide 
clarification on the immigrant revitalization theory, race and crime, and the need to 

















 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  3,143 6.203945 31.47475 3,143 6.602927 30.34811 
% Female-headed 
Household 3,134 10.87325 1.586909 3,142 11.29195 4.367255 
% Divorced/Separated 3,134 12.48535 2.335879 3,142 13.68511 2.776957 
% Foreign-born 3,134 4.062934 5.201753 3,142 4.648337 5.683668 
Economic Disadvantage 3,134 .4008195 3.028348 3,142 -.3997989 3.241724 
% Male 3,134 49.80857 2.060649 3,142 50.06028 2.380024 
% Age 15-29 3,134 19.059 4.057999 3,142 18.74134 4.206904 
% Black 3,134 8.903797 14.48252 3,142 9.016264 14.51262 
% Hispanic  3,134 7.572782 12.74502 3,142 8.946722 13.59881 
Total population 3,134 95697.82 308596.4 3,142 101387.1 325201.7 
Traditional 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 
New 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 






Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics, Whites 
 
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  3,143 1.925867 6.31629 3,143 2.016227 5.566169 
% Female-headed Household 3,131 8.455418 2.032296 3,142 8.770984 2.605204 
% Divorced/Separated 3,131 12.36174 2.466754 3,142 13.74701 3.046102 
% Foreign-born 3,131 1.262664 1.859945 3,142 1.352699 2.015885 
Economic Disadvantage 3,130 0.214287 2.906086 3,140 -0.215091 3.333053 
% Male 3,131 49.58976 1.735648 3,142 49.83251 2.14219 
% Age 15-29 3,131 17.61412 4.072929 3,142 17.1609 4.242946 
% Black 3,131 8.912217 14.4869 3,142 9.016264 14.51262 
% Hispanic  3,131 7.550703 12.69337 3,142 8.946722 13.59881 
Total population 3,131 95789.3 308730 3,142 101387.1 325201.7 
Traditional 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 
New 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 




 Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics, Hispanics 
 
Appendix D. Descriptive Statistics, Blacks
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  3,143 2.870506 18.00172 3,143 3.250716 19.72618 
% Female-headed 
Households 
2,116 24.11977 9.453992 2,716 21.43043 18.34 
% Divorced/Separated 1,775 15.36549 3.712483 3,030 15.34548 14.08175 
% Foreign-born 1,775 4.176535 6.776814 3,047 7.683469 14.14341 
Economic Disadvantage 1,646 0.262577 1.811333 1,933 -0.265792 2.397049 
% Male 2,140 55.13864 12.00761 3,047 58.17938 19.20908 
% Age 15-29 2,140 26.43166 9.748763 3,047 27.57879 17.90258 
% Black 2,140 12.84472 16.06594 3,142 9.016264 14.51262 
% Hispanic  2,140 8.061028 12.48021 3,142 8.946722 13.59881 
Total population 2,140 134391.7 367032.1 3,142 101387.1 325201.7 
Traditional 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 
New 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 
Low immigration 3,135 .4395534 .4964119 3,135 .4395534 .4964119 
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  3,143 1.186128 11.18657 3,143 1.097041 8.95365 
% Female-headed 
Households 2,612 14.4194 6.623997 3,084 15.31919 13.90838 
% Divorced/Separated 2,069 10.86184 3.657581 3,129 12.0086 10.04668 
% Foreign-born 2,069 30.17954 14.7792 3,134 26.44494 16.05968 
Economic 
Disadvantage 1,935 .2661619 1.815813 2,457 -.2107622 2.610482 
% Male 2,620 54.2019 6.458647 3,134 53.55194 11.86684 
% Age 15-29 2,620 27.85101 6.07352 3,134 25.60198 11.08267 
% Black 2,620 9.561164 14.26888 3,142 9.016264 14.51262 
% Hispanic  2,620 8.733626 13.61897 3,142 8.946722 13.59881 
Total population 2,620 113126 334761.2 3,142 101387.1 325201.7 
Traditional 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 3,135 .0507177 .2194556 
New 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 3,135 .5097289 .4999851 



















 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  159 8.09434 19.05315 159 6.490566 13.88919 
% Female-headed Household 157 7.923367 2.417612 159 7.929375 3.217913 
% Divorced/Separated 157 12.34076 2.916481 159 13.38302 4.059404 
% Foreign-born 157 5.806062 5.104446 159 6.193732 5.33157 
Economic Disadvantage 157 -2.269387 3.158068 158 -2.932432 3.80978 
% Male 157 50.18414 3.282399 159 50.55306 3.982057 
% Age 15-29 157 16.70789 3.866877 159 16.572 4.463437 
% Black 157 6.425796 9.460584 159 6.413836 9.262156 
% Hispanic  157 36.54299 23.82354 159 39.85283 24.47963 
Total population 157 591619.3 1091681 159 621708.7 1134625 
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  1,598 1.790989 5.125854 1,598 1.996871 5.356483 
% Female-headed Household 1,598 8.718653 1.901717 1,598 9.154577 2.453212 
% Divorced/Separated 1,598 12.54612 2.291161 1,598 13.98379 2.828167 
% Foreign-born 1,598 0.9008726 0.9356074 1,598 1.007753 1.139782 
Economic Disadvantage 1,597 0.4700853 2.990572 1,597 0.133675 3.358677 
% Male 1,598 49.40962 1.453062 1,598 49.61393 1.737666 
% Age 15-29 1,598 17.62575 3.360595 1,598 17.08881 3.475761 
% Black 1,598 11.60989 15.58925 1,598 11.73404 15.6335 
% Hispanic  1,598 6.263611 8.868378 1,598 7.78761 9.80979 
















 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  1,378 1.381713 3.764801 1,378 1.532656 3.566266 
% Female-headed Household 1,376 8.210421 2.089358 1,377 8.436126 2.627896 
% Divorced/Separated 1,376 12.15 2.589396 1,377 13.51031 3.126927 
% Foreign-born 1,376 1.16443 1.176128 1,377 1.186863 1.2692 
Economic Disadvantage 1,376 0.20079 2.631628 1,377 -0.2909136 3.089043 
% Male 1,376 49.73113 1.756354 1,377 49.9951 2.155846 
% Age 15-29 1,376 17.70401 4.779808 1,377 17.31104 4.930642 
% Black 1,376 6.063009 12.96291 1,377 6.208351 13.02487 
% Hispanic  1,376 5.737464 10.48052 1,377 6.742556 11.16718 
Total population 1,376 66093.4 143228.8 1,377 68008.79 144980.5 
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  159 17.06289 49.68275 159 16.91824 59.34644 
% Female-headed Household 125 22.40756 8.962887 143 19.62909 15.35494 
% Divorced/Separated 106 15.125 2.831147 153 15.88366 14.0533 
% Foreign-born 106 13.74809 10.53525 154 15.16782 15.59085 
Economic Disadvantage 104 -1.515262 1.647478 116 -2.10639 1.967593 
% Male 126 53.45505 9.565436 154 57.09604 18.34469 
% Age 15-29 126 24.33431 6.038653 154 23.65183 11.49181 
% Black 126 7.823016 10.07651 159 6.413836 9.262156 
% Hispanic  126 33.73254 22.24859 159 39.85283 24.47963 



















 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  1,598 2.374218 12.55206 1,598 3.047559 15.63249 
% Female-headed Household 1,177 25.59711 8.565728 1,428 23.3641 16.89117 
% Divorced/Separated 1,019 15.73533 3.345353 1,558 15.41348 12.50227 
% Foreign-born 1,019 2.971908 5.762348 1,564 6.57323 13.6795 
Economic Disadvantage 965 0.4793354 1.724803 1,099 -0.0579016 2.283728 
% Male 1,186 53.55674 10.98048 1,564 56.59046 17.64566 
% Age 15-29 1,186 24.95556 8.005715 1,564 26.36036 16.37201 
% Black 1,186 15.48858 16.40209 1,598 11.73404 15.6335 
% Hispanic  1,186 6.356619 8.421734 1,598 7.78761 9.80979 
Total population 1,186 93553.6 187122.1 1,598 78822.64 184550.1 
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  1,378 1.825109 15.77329 1,378 1.928157 13.3011 
% Female-headed Household 814 22.24655 10.3444 1,138 19.34149 20.09596 
% Divorced/Separated 650 14.82492 4.2785 1,311 15.26766 15.77405 
% Foreign-born 650 4.50412 6.176061 1,321 7.974067 14.01561 
Economic Disadvantage 577 0.2205038 1.804047 715 -0.274983 2.493981 
% Male 828 57.6607 13.26419 1,321 60.05324 20.79795 
% Age 15-29 828 28.86513 11.77884 1,321 29.43205 19.88953 
% Black 828 9.82192 15.61255 1,377 6.208351 13.02487 
% Hispanic  828 6.595833 10.94006 1,377 6.742556 11.16718 
















 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  159 14.37736 43.96542 159 12.86164 35.44178 
% Female-headed Household 156 17.39044 5.290759 159 18.32966 6.227619 
% Divorced/Separated 155 10.81935 2.728811 159 11.68742 3.714694 
% Foreign-born 155 37.11911 12.42852 159 34.66499 12.29791 
Economic Disadvantage 154 0.2755879 1.900553 156 -0.5345395 1.995239 
% Male 156 51.59659 3.684443 159 51.8973 5.499024 
% Age 15-29 156 25.87286 3.493845 159 24.20936 4.626484 
% Black 156 6.457692 9.482725 159 6.413836 9.262156 
% Hispanic  156 37.23654 23.76215 159 39.85283 24.47963 
Total population 156 595397.3 1094167 159 621708.7 1134625 
 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  1,598 0.6414268 5.865831 1,598 0.6101377 4.066766 
% Female-headed Household 1,377 13.90549 6.403606 1,573 15.49527 13.893 
% Divorced/Separated 1,085 10.38419 3.670614 1,594 11.64304 9.795079 
% Foreign-born 1,085 36.45419 13.9601 1,595 31.53422 15.74899 
Economic Disadvantage 1,018 0.6341929 1.793867 1,292 0.2425441 2.621288 
% Male 1,382 55.25871 6.303901 1,595 54.00352 11.32807 
% Age 15-29 1,382 28.06635 5.383615 1,595 24.63591 9.760348 
% Black 1,382 12.26787 15.36026 1,598 11.73404 15.6335 
% Hispanic  1,382 6.974204 9.316856 1,598 7.78761 9.80979 















 2007     2017     
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Homicide  1,378 0.3026125 1.617535 1,378 0.3105951 1.652679 
% Female-headed Household 1,079 14.64569 6.945622 1,344 14.77256 14.53147 
% Divorced/Separated 829 11.49493 3.699699 1,368 12.44788 10.74111 




0.2267701 1.709988 1,005 -0.7320033 2.574181 
% Male 1,082 53.2277 6.70759 1,372 53.20655 12.94809 
% Age 15-29 1,082 27.86116 7.068849 1,372 26.86045 12.78698 
% Black 1,082 6.551433 12.61521 1,377 6.208351 13.02487 
% Hispanic  1,082 6.871396 11.52563 1,377 6.742556 11.16718 





Appendix N. Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models, All Race/Ethnicity Groups 
 










Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born -0.0837** -0.0810** -0.113** -0.102** -0.0294* -0.0302* -0.00236 0.00524 
 (0.00926)     (0.0107) (0.0377) (0.0392) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0121) 
% Divorced           -      0.0205             - 0.0353           - 0.00233            - -0.0205 
           -     (0.0235)             - (0.0329)           - (0.0230)            - (0.0338) 
% Female-Headed Households 
 
          - 
          - 
     0.0137 
    (0.0211) 
            - 
            - 
0.0235 
(0.0427) 
          - 
          - 
0.0173 
(0.0160) 
           - 
           - 
0.0589* 
(0.0247) 
Economic Index 0.0401* 0.0336 0.0330 0.0182 0.118* 0.107* -0.130 -0.181* 
 (0.0204) (0.0217) (0.0288) (0.0308) (0.0509) (0.0522) (0.0807) (0.0847) 
% Male 0.180** 0.176** -0.0343 -0.0355 0.0913** 0.101** 0.0605 0.0878 
 (0.0406) (0.0427) (0.0541) (0.0560) (0.0275) (0.0287) (0.0454) (0.0467) 
% Age 15-29 -0.0510** -0.0457** -0.0470* -0.0391 -0.0561** -0.0551* 0.0281 0.0217 
 (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0249) (0.0247) 
% Black 0.0297** 0.0263** 0.0231* 0.0236* 0.00774 0.00625 0.0402* 0.0362* 
 (0.00623) (0.00688) (0.00940) (0.00930) (0.00806) (0.00807) (0.0159) (0.0157) 
% Hispanic          -            - 0.000932 0.000514 0.00955 0.00866 0.000814 0.000849 
          -            - (0.00827) (0.00826) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.00995) (0.0101) 
Total Population          -            - -3.49e-07* -3.44e-07* -7.10e-07** -7.05e-07** -5.38e-07** -5.61e-07** 
          -            - (1.43e-07) (1.45e-07) (1.63e-07) (1.61e-07) (1.59e-07) (1.56e-07) 
Constant -17.02**     -17.34** -6.633* -7.433** -10.96** -11.94** -12.52** -14.67** 
 (1.991) (2.066) (2.651) (2.793) (1.421) (1.712) (1.967) (2.251) 
         











Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
 
 
 Traditional New Low Immigration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born 0.0103 0.0162 -0.141 -0.157 -0.295** -0.274** 
    (0.0744) (0.0825) (0.0923) (0.0951) (0.0963) (0.0994) 
% Divorced         - 0.0176           - -0.0722           - 0.140* 
         - (0.106)           - (0.0489)           - (0.0560) 
% Female-Headed 
Households 
        -  
        -  
-0.172 
(0.163) 
          - 
          - 
0.0255 
(0.0595) 
          - 
          - 
0.0339 
(0.0689) 
Economic Index 0.168 0.192 0.0420 0.0618 -0.00300 -0.0523 
    (0.116) (0.124) (0.0444) (0.0499) (0.0455) (0.0517) 
% Male -0.364* -0.438* 0.0447 0.0727 0.0322 -0.00693 
 (0.178) (0.189) (0.0931) (0.102) (0.0942) (0.1000) 
% Age 15-29 0.169 0.201 0.0389 0.0266 -0.0750** -0.0461 
 (0.0981) (0.104) (0.0380) (0.0381) (0.0244) (0.0270) 
% Black -0.0486 -0.0536* 0.00131 0.0186 0.0127 0.0132 
 (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0156) (0.0162) 
% Hispanic  0.0228 0.0284 -0.0223 -0.00254 -0.00144 -0.00484 
 (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0148) (0.0151) 
Total Population -3.83e-07 -3.97e-07 -2.16e-07 -2.87e-07 1.81e-06* 1.57e-06 
 (2.20e-07) (2.27e-07) (2.90e-07) (3.09e-07) (8.39e-07) (8.58e-07) 
Constant 6.149 10.43 -11.61* -11.92* -9.453* -10.09* 
 (8.152) (9.214) (4.594) (5.046) (4.627) (4.919) 
          




Appendix P. Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models, Black by Destination 
Type 
 










 Traditional New Low Immigration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born 
0.0333 0.0307 0.0255 0.0229 -0.0695** -0.0729** 
 (0.0349) (0.0359) (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0244) (0.0250) 
% Divorced           - 0.00322           - -0.0169          - 0.0142 
           - (0.0721)           - (0.0301)          - (0.0407) 
% Female-headed 
Households 
          - 
          - 
-0.0451 
(0.0588) 
          - 
          - 
0.0125 
(0.0213) 
         - 
         - 
0.0356 
(0.0265) 
Economic Index 0.373 0.391 0.00156 -0.0119 0.287** 0.258** 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.0757) (0.0785) (0.0982) (0.0999) 
 % Male 0.0552 0.0242 0.0919* 0.0974* 0.116* 0.133** 
 (0.0734) (0.0855) (0.0421) (0.0434) (0.0461) (0.0461) 
% Age 15-29 -0.0838 -0.0833 0.00205 -0.00465 -0.0713* -0.0639* 
 (0.0655) (0.0667) (0.0364) (0.0384) (0.0297) (0.0314) 
 % Black 0.0176 0.0179 0.00816 0.00708 0.0145 0.00890 
 (0.0246) (0.0251) (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0157) (0.0158) 
% Hispanic 0.0519* 0.0524* -0.0206 -0.0222 -0.0385 -0.0358 
 (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0227) 
Total Population -6.51e-07** -5.95e-07* -1.51e-06** -1.44e-06** 2.89e-06** 2.69e-06** 
 (2.06e-07) (2.33e-07) (4.88e-07) (5.02e-07) (8.12e-07) (8.26e-07) 
  Constant -9.840* -7.228 -11.67** -11.85** -11.75** -13.86** 
     (4.006) (5.821) (2.171) (2.493)  (2.363) (2.796)  






Appendix Q. Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models, Hispanic by 
Destination Type 
 







 Traditional New Low Immigration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born 0.00564 0.0204 0.00835 0.0106 -0.0916** -0.0864* 
 (0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0182) (0.0189) (0.0345) (0.0377) 
% Divorced         - -0.109          - -0.0409           - -0.0247 
         - (0.0763)          - (0.0463)           - (0.0607) 
% Female-Headed 
Households 
        - 
        - 
0.152** 
(0.0588) 
         - 
         - 
0.0297 
(0.0320) 
          - 
          - 
0.0274 
(0.0516) 
Economic Index -0.288 -0.416* -0.0587 -0.0831 -0.444** -0.467** 
 (0.175) (0.183) (0.135) (0.139) (0.153) (0.160) 
% Male 0.0536 0.149 0.0699 0.0757 0.0490 0.0510 
 (0.122) (0.135) (0.0584) (0.0591) (0.104) (0.107) 
% Age 15-29 -0.00577 -0.00131 0.0462 0.0445 0.166** 0.163** 
 (0.0557) (0.0550) (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0601) (0.0613) 
% Black 0.00123 -0.0113 0.0523* 0.0517* -0.145 -0.141 
 (0.0351) (0.0376) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0861) (0.0931) 
% Hispanic 0.00559 0.00345 0.0291 0.0299 -0.168** -0.170** 
 (0.0186) (0.0203) (0.0294) (0.0267) (0.0573) (0.0584) 
Total Population -3.53e-07 -4.23e-07* -7.89e-07* -7.85e-07* 3.99e-06 3.92e-06 
 (2.12e-07) (1.91e-07) (3.62e-07) (3.43e-07) (2.15e-06) (2.18e-06) 
Constant -11.47* -18.22** -14.51** -14.85** -3.512 -3.819 
 (5.545) (6.783) (2.498) (2.807) (5.555) (5.817) 
             







Appendix R. Cross Sectional Negative Binomial Regression Models, All Race/Ethnicity Groups 
 











Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born 0.0238** 0.0245** -0.0311** -0.0170 -0.0137** -0.00511 -0.00267 -0.000414 
 (0.00322) (0.00313) (0.0114) (0.00969) (0.00494) (0.00476) (0.00277) (0.00323) 
% Divorced           - 0.144**             - 0.161**           - 0.102**            - 0.0477* 
           - (0.0115)             - (0.0126)           - (0.0139)            - (0.0208) 
% Female-Headed Households 
 
          - 
          - 
0.0386** 
(0.0112) 
            - 
            - 
-0.0488** 
(0.0170) 
          - 
          - 
0.0337** 
(0.00821) 
           - 
           - 
-0.0163 
(0.0102) 
Economic Index 0.0821** 0.0270** 0.0878** 0.0520** 0.109** 0.0241 0.0923** 0.106** 
 (0.00730) (0.00907) (0.00816) (0.00912) (0.0205) (0.0250) (0.0248) (0.0278) 
% Male -0.0301** -0.0239* 0.0329* 0.00759 -0.0346** -0.0214** 0.00694 0.00175 
 (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.00709) (0.00717) (0.0130) (0.0139) 
% Age 15-29 0.0191** 0.0376** 0.0154** 0.0370** -0.00187 0.0155 0.00951 0.0181 
 (0.00486) (0.00488) (0.00498) (0.00499) (0.00738) (0.00793) (0.0111) (0.0118) 
% Black 0.0249** 0.0170** 0.0236** 0.0220** 0.00186 0.00332 0.0290** 0.0282** 
 (0.00138) (0.00210) (0.00150) (0.00143) (0.00179) (0.00176) (0.00299) (0.00301) 
% Hispanic          -            - 0.0158** 0.0108** 0.00521 0.00418 0.00149 0.00201 
          -            - (0.00208) (0.00200) (0.00322) (0.00308) (0.00231) (0.00233) 
Total Population          -            - 2.22e-07** 1.25e-07* 4.05e-07** 2.52e-07** 1.19e-07* 1.28e-07* 
          -            - (6.29e-08) (4.89e-08) (7.41e-08) (6.18e-08) (4.98e-08) (5.09e-08) 
Constant -9.427** -12.34** -12.71** -13.46** -7.157** -10.83** -10.50** -10.80** 
 (0.539) (0.575) (0.787) (0.820) (0.356) (0.575) (0.657) (0.851) 
         







Appendix S. Cross Sectional Negative Binomial Regression Models, White by 
Destination Type 







 Traditional New Low Immigration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born -0.0563** -0.0238 0.00702 -0.00172 0.0685* 0.0177 
 (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0333) (0.0312) (0.0349) (0.0338) 
% Divorced         - 0.159**          - 0.161**           - 0.146** 




        - 
        - 
-0.0824 
(0.0443) 
         - 
         - 
-0.0534* 
(0.0259) 
          - 
          - 
-0.0359  
(0.0299) 
Economic Index 0.0810** 0.0515 0.113** 0.0658** 0.101** 0.0613** 
 (0.0298) (0.0348) (0.0113) (0.0134) (0.0151) (0.0170) 
% Male 0.111** 0.0451 0.0140 0.00705 0.0441 0.0191 
 (0.0368) (0.0399) (0.0247) (0.0238) (0.0271) (0.0272) 
% Age 15-29 0.00653 0.0274 0.0202* 0.0352** 0.0103 0.0352** 
 (0.0203) (0.0184) (0.00803) (0.00798) (0.00690) (0.00759) 
% Black 0.0276** 0.0288** 0.00784** 0.0205** 0.0220** 0.0203** 
 (0.00781) (0.00658) (0.00189) (0.00187) (0.00289) (0.00284) 
% Hispanic 0.0111* 0.0142** 0.000973 0.00793 0.0173** 0.0112** 
 (0.00443) (0.00408) (0.00420) (0.00426) (0.00408) (0.00416) 
Total Population 1.29e-07* 4.85e-08 5.62e-07** 3.59e-07** 1.44e-07 3.10e-07 
 (5.87e-08) (4.64e-08) (1.46e-07) (1.24e-07) (2.23e-07) (2.08e-07) 
Constant -16.17** -14.92** -11.92** -13.34** -13.36** -14.04** 
 (1.750) (2.093) (1.213) (1.215) (1.315) (1.375) 
       
      







Appendix T. Cross Sectional Negative Binomial Regression Models, Black by 
Destination Type 













 Traditional New Low Immigration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born -0.0319** -0.0198** -0.0145 -0.00417 -0.0104 -0.00399 
 (0.00635) (0.00672) (0.0103) (0.00990) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
% Divorced         - 0.150**          - 0.0772**           - 0.0654** 
         - (0.0401)          - (0.0191)           - (0.0246) 
% Female-Headed 
Households 
        - 
        - 
0.0223 
(0.0211) 
         - 
         - 
0.0411** 
(0.0119) 
          - 
          - 
0.0199 
(0.0140) 
Economic Index 0.295** 0.209** 0.172** 0.0684 0.0962** 0.0448 
 (0.0489) (0.0609) (0.0288) (0.0350) (0.0370) (0.0480) 
% Male 0.00718 0.00308 -0.0496** -0.0332** -0.0207* -0.0156 
 (0.0200) (0.0234) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0107) 
% Age 15-29 -0.0766* -0.0239 0.00518 0.0136 -0.0141 -0.000974 
 (0.0361) (0.0382) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0120) 
% Black 0.00982 0.0112* 0.00233 0.00338 0.00327 0.00387 
 (0.00580) (0.00531) (0.00243) (0.00241) (0.00294) (0.00291) 
% Hispanic -0.00879 -0.00771 0.00595 0.00418 0.0114 0.00836 
 (0.00514) (0.00492) (0.00628) (0.00618) (0.00642) (0.00654) 
Total Population 6.30e-08 2.29e-08 1.19e-06** 8.37e-07** 7.45e-07** 5.98e-07** 
 (5.01e-08) (4.28e-08) (1.81e-07) (1.67e-07) (1.67e-07) (1.63e-07) 
Constant -6.312** -10.62** -6.851** -10.25** -7.617** -9.779** 
 (1.099) (1.938) (0.543) (0.804) (0.557) (0.952) 
       
      










Appendix U. Cross Sectional Negative Binomial Regression Models, Hispanic by 
Destination Type 
Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
 
 Traditional New Low Immigration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Foreign-born -0.0101 -0.0111* -0.00990 -0.00193 0.00761 0.00601 
 (0.00560) (0.00560) (0.00539) (0.00636) (0.00696) (0.00843) 
% Divorced         - 0.0615*          - 0.0644*           - 0.0172 
         - (0.0353)          - (0.0267)           - (0.0375) 
% Female-Headed 
Households 
        - 
        - 
-0.0293 
(0.0187) 
         - 
         - 
0.000737 
(0.0161) 
          - 
          - 
-0.0148 
(0.0195) 
Economic Index 0.0353 0.0648 0.144** 0.132** 0.0649 0.0876 
 (0.0446) (0.0537) (0.0417) (0.0446) (0.0463) (0.0577) 
% Male 0.0692* 0.0607 0.00653 0.00249 -0.0209 -0.0238 
 (0.0286) (0.0327) (0.0194) (0.0198) (0.0237) (0.0241) 
% Age 15-29 0.0416 0.0635* 0.0301 0.0407 -0.00511 -0.00376 
 (0.0295) (0.0299) (0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0147) (0.0160) 
% Black 0.0186** 0.0182** 0.0286** 0.0276** 0.0356** 0.0355** 
 (0.00553) (0.00537) (0.00417) (0.00411) (0.00552) (0.00557) 
% Hispanic 0.000361 0.000181 0.00824 0.00913* 0.00390 0.00335 
 (0.00386) (0.00421) (0.00510) (0.00508) (0.00506) (0.00513) 
Total Population 5.43e-08 5.75e-08 5.19e-07** 4.39e-07** 1.30e-07 1.87e-07 
 (3.80e-08) (3.56e-08) (1.62e-07) (1.53e-07) (2.19e-07) (2.37e-07) 
Constant -14.03** -14.25** -11.02** -12.07** -9.080** -8.882** 
 (1.427) (2.083) (0.956) (1.104) (1.229) (1.537) 
       
      




























Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                      
1.Homicide 1          
2.Foreign-Born 0.3268 1         
3.% Female-headed Households 0.1826 0.1069 1        
4.% Divorced 0.0293 -0.1192 0.413 1       
5.Economic Disadvantage 0.01 -0.0967 0.6654 0.42 1      
6.% Black 0.1737 -0.0139 0.7442 0.2216 0.463 1     
7.% Hispanic 0.1383 0.6762 0.1387 -0.0186 0.1306 -0.1064 1    
8.% Male -0.1001 0.0637 -0.167 0.0165 -0.0221 -0.1179 0.145 1   
9.% Age 15-29 0.13 0.2333 0.2824 -0.1432 0.1141 0.2072 0.1608 0.0737 1  













Appendix W. Correlation Table, White Sample. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                      
1.Homicide 1          
2.Foreign-Born 0.3593 1         
3.% Divorced 0.0833 -0.0645 1        
4.% Female-headed Households 0.0821 -0.0742 0.5448 1       
5.Economic Disadvantage -0.1358 -0.3411 0.4325 0.4906 1      
6.% Male -0.0824 0.005 0.0294 -0.247 -0.0924 1     
7.% Age 15-29 0.1125 0.0851 -0.1711 0.1418 -0.0167 0.0142 1    
8.% Black 0.1116 0.0359 0.1057 0.104 0.0965 -0.0181 0.0538 1   
9.% Hispanic 0.1285 0.3282 0.0738 -0.0539 -0.1464 0.0812 -0.0664 -0.1053 1  































Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                      
1.Homicide 1          
2.Foreign-Born 0.0204 1         
3.% Divorced 0.0384 -0.1786 1        
4.% Female-headed Households 0.1024 -0.2344 0.1422 1       
5.Economic Disadvantage -0.0171 -0.2935 0.1238 0.4295 1      
6.% Male -0.1304 0.1334 -0.0871 -0.3639 -0.0678 1     
7.% Age 15-29 -0.037 0.1931 -0.3531 -0.153 0.0268 0.2843 1    
8.% Black 0.1879 -0.2903 0.0358 0.3872 0.3534 -0.3258 -0.1761 1   
9.% Hispanic 0.0933 0.1899 -0.0129 -0.1056 -0.1815 0.0735 0.0348 -0.2002 1  














Appendix Y. Correlation Table, Hispanic Sample.  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                      
1.Homicide 1          
2.Foreign-Born 0.0612 1         
3.% Divorced 0.0027 -0.261 1        
4.% Female-headed Households 0.0633 -0.0851 0.2616 1       
5.Economic Disadvantage -0.0001 0.2723 0.0236 0.2046 1      
6.% Male -0.0474 0.1785 -0.0146 -0.1739 0.1025 1     
7.% Age 15-29 -0.0056 0.0389 -0.1924 0.0174 0.0333 0.1315 1    
8.% Black 0.045 0.2673 -0.0332 0.0035 0.136 0.0991 0.0418 1   
9.% Hispanic 0.1931 -0.0075 0.0201 0.1108 0.1312 -0.0836 -0.126 -0.1338 1  
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